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THE POWER AND PROMISE OF PROCEDURE:
EXAMINING THE CLASS ACTION LANDSCAPE
AFTER WAL-MART V. DUKES
Suzette M. Malveaux*
INTRODUCTION
When we think about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the is-
sues can seem very technical, and the topic dry and difficult. But pro-
cedural issues are extremely important and have a tremendous impact
on all of us. Whether it is everyday folks (like employees and consum-
ers who are trying to enforce their rights), or multi-national corpora-
tions (who are central to the economic well-being of our society), the
process that we use to resolve disputes really matters. This Article
discusses the power and promise of procedure, focusing on a particu-
lar procedural device-the class action-and the Supreme Court's re-
cent interpretation of Rule 23' (the class action rule) in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.2
I. CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT
To understand the power and promise of aggregate litigation, we
need to put it in context. As a former civil rights attorney who repre-
sented employees challenging alleged discrimination (based on disa-
bility, gender, race, and national origin), I found the one thing all my
clients had in common was courage. While my clients were not per-
fect, they were brave. It is not easy to challenge your employer, much
less the largest retailer in the world.
It took great courage for Betty Dukes, a greeter at Wal-Mart, to
challenge a giant like Wal-Mart. It involved serious professional risk
and personal sacrifice. But she did not have to do it alone. She was
* I am deeply grateful to the DePaul University College of Law for inviting me to give the
keynote address at the 22nd Annual DePaul Law Review Symposium, entitled Class Action
Rollback? Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class Action Litigation, held on February 24,
2012. This keynote address was based on my article How Goliath Won: The Future Implications
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Colloquy, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 34 (2011).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
2. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). For a procedural history and analy-
sis of Dukes, see Suzette Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y 375 (2011).
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empowered to challenge a goliath like Wal-Mart by uniting with other
women with similar complaints and pursuing her case as a class action.
Whether an employee can aggregate her case with others is, in some
ways, a civil rights issue. When we think of civil rights, we often think
of voting, education, housing, or employment; we do not often con-
sider procedure and its importance to the enforcement of civil rights
laws. Procedure is really an issue of access to justice. 3
Historically, class actions have been the basis for the most impor-
tant civil rights cases, addressing school desegregation, prisoners'
rights, and employment discrimination, among other issues.
Indeed, one of the most important Supreme Court cases of the
twentieth century-Brown v. Board of Education4-was a class ac-
tion. In fact, it was the combination of five different class action cases
brought in Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washing-
ton D.C. That consolidated class action, of course, resulted in the Su-
preme Court's unanimous decision that the "separate but equal"
doctrine was unconstitutional.5
A class action, however, is an exception to the usual rule that an
individual brings a case on his or her own behalf.6 Typically, the plain-
tiff is the master of his or her own claim. Because a representative
action runs counter to this fundamental principle, the courts and Con-
gress have appropriately established rigorous criteria to ensure that
departure from the norm is justified. The federal class action rule,
Rule 23, sets out the requirements for when a party can represent
others so that efficiency and due process are both served. The courts
must conduct a "rigorous analysis" to make certain the Rule's require-
ments are met.7
One of the challenges to aggregate litigation is determining what
due process requires, especially when claims for monetary relief are
involved. When seeking back pay or monetary damages, class mem-
bers' interests may start to diverge, breaking down the cohesiveness of
the group. A court must be very careful not to deprive due process to
class members in a mandatory class action. As the Supreme Court
stated in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., "[t]he inherent tension between
representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is only magnified if ap-
plied to damages claims gathered in a mandatory class," in which class
3. For further discussion of procedure as an access to justice issue, see Suzette Malveaux,
Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHio N.U. L. REV. 621 (2011).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 495.
6. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).
7. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982).
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members need not consent to the lawsuit, or even be made aware of
it.8
Moreover, when certifying a class action, a court must also be care-
ful not to deprive a defendant of due process. A defendant must be
able to adequately defend itself from individual claims whose aggrega-
tion may mask important distinctions and available defenses. As long
as those safeguards are in place, the class action device plays a critical
role in the American civil justice system.
II. WHY THE DUKES CASE IS IMPORTANT
The Dukes decision, while silent on the actual merits of whether
Wal-Mart engaged in systemic gender discrimination, was a major
blow to the plaintiffs' case because of the unique and powerful role of
the class action. There is strength in numbers, especially when that
number is 1.5 million women. But there is also strength in due pro-
cess, especially when billions of dollars are at stake and the defendant
is being accused of massive wrongdoing.
The Dukes decision is important because it attempts to draw a
boundary line. On the one hand, the class action is a procedural asset
that promotes efficiency and court access, thereby enabling plaintiffs
with small claims and limited resources to jointly challenge wide-
spread misconduct in a single suit. On the other hand, the class action
is a procedural anomaly that is granted only under limited circum-
stances. This rigorous standard allows defendants to adequately de-
fend themselves and gives class members an opportunity to bring
individual cases when their interests diverge. Dukes is critical because
the Court drew a boundary line that favors large, powerful employers
over everyday workers alleging systemic discrimination.
Going forward, the new Dukes class certification standard jeopar-
dizes potentially meritorious challenges to systemic discrimination.
By redefining the class certification requirements for employment dis-
crimination cases in two major areas, this ruling compromises employ-
ees' access to justice.
III. How THE DUKES RULING COMPROMISES ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A. Commonality
The first issue in Dukes was commonality. At the outset, the major-
ity decertified the class by determining that there was not enough glue
to hold the case together as a class action-the commonality required
8. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999).
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under Rule 23(a)(2) was not met. 9 In a 5-4 decision written by Justice
Scalia, the majority raised the bar for commonality, which was argua-
bly one of the easiest class action thresholds to satisfy. Conceding that
all it takes is a single common question to satisfy the requirement, the
Court concluded that this criterion was not met.10 However, not sur-
prisingly, the Court appropriately reiterated that the class certification
standard is tough; a judge must rigorously analyze whether a case
should be a class action, including deciding merits issues if they over-
lap with issues of class certification." Additionally, the party moving
for class certification must actually prove that the Rule 23 require-
ments are met.
12
The Court surprised many and went one step further by requiring
the plaintiffs to prove, with significant evidence, that there existed a
general policy of discrimination as a condition of class certification.
Specifically, to demonstrate commonality, the Dukes plaintiffs needed
to have "'significant proof' that Wal-Mart 'operated under a general
policy of discrimination. '113 This interpretation of commonality goes
far beyond prior Title VI 1 4 class action jurisprudence and is now even
being applied outside of the Title VII context.'5
1. Evidentiary Shortcomings
The Court did not find "significant proof" of a policy of discrimina-
tion for several troubling reasons. First, in applying the new standard,
the majority found that the evidence provided by the plaintiff class did
not establish a common claim of discriminatory bias.16 For example,
plaintiffs proffered 120 affidavits from female employees alleging dis-
crimination. 17 Despite this sworn testimony of discrimination by over
one hundred employees in a half dozen states, the Court concluded
that this evidence fell woefully short because of the sheer size and
geographic dispersion of the class.18 The Court cited International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, in which there was one an-
ecdote for every eight class members,19 to demonstrate an acceptable
9. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556-57 (2011).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2551-52.
12. Id. at 2551.
13. Id. at 2553; see also Suzette Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Colloquy, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 34, 37-45 (2011).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2006).
15. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
16. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
17. Id. at 2549.
18. Id. at 2555.
19. See id. at 2556 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977)).
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ratio of anecdotes to plaintiffs. For the Dukes plaintiffs to have col-
lected affidavits in the same proportion, they would have had to pro-
duce 187,500 affidavits for a class of 1.5 million members.
This suggested proportion (or one even in the ballpark) effectively
ensures that no plaintiff will be able to allege nationwide systemic dis-
crimination against an employer the size of Wal-Mart by using anec-
dotal evidence. Even the most affluent class counsel cannot
realistically finance and staff a case requiring this kind of showing
merely to cross the commonality threshold.
Plaintiffs also proffered testimony from a sociologist, who con-
cluded that Wal-Mart was vulnerable to gender discrimination be-
cause of its corporate culture and personnel practices. But this expert
testimony-the "only evidence of a 'general policy of discrimination"'
according to the Court-was disregarded on the grounds that the ex-
pert could not discern the extent to which stereotyped thinking and
bias influenced pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart nation-
wide.20 In other words, the sociologist could not answer the question
of how prevalent the alleged gender discrimination was at Wal-Mart.
Because the Court insisted that the answer to this question, rather
than the question itself, was the basis for plaintiffs' commonality the-
ory, the Court found the sociologist's testimony useless.21
But the answer to this "essential question" is not only unknown, but
also probably unknowable. Given the subtle, complex, and sometimes
even unconscious nature of modern discrimination, it would be practi-
cally impossible to determine with any specificity how much gender
bias infected a workplace. Regardless, courts are now also erecting
this hurdle outside of the Title VII context.
2. How Can Discretion Be a Uniform Practice?
The notion that the company's policy was to give local supervisors
unfettered discretion over employment decisions called into question
whether there was a uniform employment practice that could be chal-
lenged on a classwide basis. The notion that unchecked, subjective
decision making at 3,400 separate stores across the country could pro-
vide the common thread for a single lawsuit is admittedly
counterintuitive.
This is true, of course, if one focuses on the trees rather than the
forest. Commonality depends on the locus of analysis. If the locus is
20. Id. at 2553-54 ("[The expert's testimony] is worlds away from 'significant proof' that Wal-
Mart 'operated under a general policy of discrimination."').
21. Id. at 2554 ("If [the expert] admittedly has no answer to that question, we can safely
disregard what he has to say.").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the thousands of supervisors in the field making myriad decisions that
affect 1.5 million separate employees, it is easy to conclude that there
is no common question to be answered that would help resolve the
case.
But if the locus is the company, which gives its agents the authority
to make biased employment decisions while looking the other way, it
is easier to see how the case can be resolved on a classwide basis. By
focusing on the corporate employer, the entity culpable under Title
VII and the one responsible for systemic harm, the uniform employ-
ment practice becomes apparent. The various ways the discrimination
plays out as a result of this practice becomes a red herring, which is
irrelevant to the threshold commonality determination under Rule
23(a)(2). 22
3. How Can Gender Discrimination Be Rampant?
Even assuming Wal-Mart operated an "undisciplined system of sub-
jective decisionmaking," the Court found that this did not satisfy com-
monality. 23 This seemed to stem from the majority's skepticism, if not
disbelief, that a majority of Wal-Mart's managers might act-even
subconsciously-in a way that disfavors women's employment pros-
pects.24 The Court insisted that plaintiffs must identify a "common
mode" of how supervisors exercise their discretion, but the Court then
rejected the evidence indicating that gender bias might be the an-
swer.25 This suggests that a plausibility test may be at work, much like
the one established by the Court in the pleadings context.26
22. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Wal-Mart's delegation of discretion over pay and promotions is a policy uniform throughout
all stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will exercise it in various ways. A system
of delegated discretion ... is a practice actionable under Title VII when it produces discrimina-
tory outcomes.").
23. See id. at 2555-56 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 2554 ("[Lleft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and surely
most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, per-
formance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.").
25. Id. at 2554-55.
26. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff must
plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
duct alleged." (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).
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4. How Can There Be a Policy of Discriminatory Conduct When
There Is a Written Policy to the Contrary?
The Court juxtaposed Wal-Mart's official antidiscrimination policy
with its policy of giving local supervisors unfettered discretion to make
employment decisions, and then concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
show "significant proof" of a policy of discrimination at Wal-Mart. 27
But surely the mere presence of a written antidiscrimination policy
should not be able to destroy commonality. Otherwise, all employers
could bulletproof themselves from class liability by inserting boiler-
plate language into their employee handbooks. In fact, given contem-
porary societal attitudes about flagrant gender discrimination, one
would expect most employers to have an official antidiscrimination
statement in their personnel materials. It would be naive to presume
that just because there is a written policy in place, no gender bias ex-
ists in the workplace. In contrast, the dissent, comprised of all the
female justices and Justice Breyer, had no problem concluding that
Wal-Mart's discretionary policy may have resulted in systemic gender
bias.28
B. Back Pay and Other Monetary Relief
The second issue in Dukes was back pay, which compensates em-
ployees for earnings they would have received in the absence of dis-
crimination. A particularly serious challenge to employees in a class
action brought under Rule 23(b)(2), the class action rule often used in
civil rights cases, is whether they can seek monetary relief as well as
injunctive relief.29
Back pay not only makes victims of discrimination "whole" but,
more importantly, it also encourages defendants to voluntarily comply
with the law.30 When discrimination is established, there is even a
27. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
28. Id. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The practice of dele-
gating to supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal stan-
dards, has long been known to have the potential to produce disparate effects.").
29. See Malveaux, supra note 13, at 45-50.
30. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-21, 420 n.12 (1975); see also 1
NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS Ass'N, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 2.10(2)(a)(i) (Janice Goodman & Christopher Bello eds., 2011) ("Back pay is the most com-
mon form of monetary relief in Title VII cases. [It is] routinely granted barring extraordinary
circumstances."); id. ("[T]he denial of back pay to prevailing plaintiffs is a minor exception
rather than the rule.").
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presumption in favor of back pay, which is essential to enforcement of
the law. 31
Nonetheless, the Court unanimously held that back pay was not ap-
propriate under Rule 23(b)(2) in this case. 32 This is surprising because
the decision effectively reversed almost a half century of Title VII ju-
risprudence permitting back pay under similar circumstances. 33
Courts have regularly allowed back pay for civil rights cases under
Rule 23(b)(2) on the grounds that this monetary relief is equitable and
critical to Title VII's remedial scheme. 34 Even those appellate courts
with the toughest class certification standards have recognized that
back pay is consistent with Rule 23(b)(2). 35 Yet, despite this history,
the Court found the equitable nature of back pay irrelevant. 36 In-
stead, the question was whether back pay was nonincidental to the
injunctive or declaratory relief sought.37
The Court also concluded that Wal-Mart was entitled to have back
pay determined individually rather than based on a formula, and that
under Title VII the company had a right to raise individual affirmative
31. See 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams) (providing a sec-
tion-by-section analysis of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972); see also United
States v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (describing the compensatory and
deterrent functions of back pay).
32. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
33. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[Dukes]
reduced to rubble more than forty years of precedent in the Courts of Appeals, which had long
held that back pay is recoverable in employment discrimination class actions certified under
Rule 23(b)(2).").
34. See 5 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 92.11(1) & n.4 (2d ed. 2012) (cit-
ing cases to support the assertion that "the majority of courts have had little difficulty fitting an
action for back pay and injunctive relief into Rule 23(b)(2)").
35. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618-19 n.40 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev'd,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) ("[It] is ... well accepted, even by circuits that are generally restrictive in
certifying classes seeking monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2), that a request for back pay in
a Title VII case is fully compatible with the certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class."); see, e.g.,
Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e do not hold, nor
have we ever held, that monetary relief is fundamentally incompatible with Rule 23(b)(2).");
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Rule
23(b)(2) permits monetary relief that is equitable, and "[black pay, of course, had long been
recognized as an equitable remedy under Title VII"); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974) (" '[Tihe award of back pay, as one element of the equitable rem-
edy, conflicts in no way with the limitations of Rule 23(b)(2).'" (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971)); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122,
1125 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but
rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exer-
cise of the court's discretion, and not by a jury.").
36. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.
37. Id. at 2557 (holding that monetary relief may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if such
relief is not "incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief"). The Court, however, refrained
from prohibiting all forms of incidental monetary relief under its interpretation. See id. at 2560.
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defenses to each class member's claim following a finding of a pattern
or practice of discrimination. 38 According to the Court, it was the in-
dividualized-not the monetary-nature of back pay that made it in-
appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification. Once the Court
concluded that back pay had to be calculated individually, it was not a
stretch for the Court to find that back pay was nonincidental and
therefore inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification. 39
C. Rule 23(b)(3) Is Not a Great Solution
This shift in Title VII jurisprudence is significant because employees
will have greater difficulty in bringing their monetary claims under the
alternative class action rule-Rule 23(b)(3). Civil rights plaintiffs
have historically challenged systemic discrimination under Rule
23(b)(2), in part because of the more onerous burdens and costs asso-
ciated with (b)(3).
Rule 23(b)(3) certification is available if common issues
predominate over individual ones and a class action is a superior
mechanism for resolving the dispute. 40 Not surprisingly, if a court de-
cides that monetary relief has to be calculated on an individualized
basis, the court is more likely to conclude that individual issues
predominate over common ones, thereby foreclosing Rule 23(b)(3)
certification.
Additionally, Rule 23 also requires that (b)(3) class members re-
ceive notice of the litigation and the right to opt out.41 Thus, even
when plaintiffs may be able to clear the (b)(3) certification hurdle, the
cost of sending out class notices, which can reach hundreds of
thousands of dollars, may be prohibitive. This means that some em-
ployees alleging systemic discrimination may not be able to success-
fully bring a class action at all.
IV. THE IMPACT OF DUKES
So what is the impact of Dukes? Is it a sea change or merely a
clarification of the law? Is this a catastrophic blow for the plaintiffs or
just another change to which plaintiffs' counsel will simply adjust?
The truth is that it is too soon to know. It would be tempting hence-
forth to attribute every class decertification or class certification de-
nial to Dukes. However, we need to ask ourselves whether Dukes is
38. Id. at 2560-61.
39. Id. at 2561.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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being cited because it is a change in the law or because it is simply the
latest Supreme Court statement on class certification. It is not as if
employment discrimination cases were easy to certify before now. So
what impact might Dukes have?
A. The Impact of the Commonality Ruling
The implications of this close, highly controversial portion of the
Dukes opinion are varied. On the one hand, the Court's ruling may
have little impact on employment discrimination class actions given
the size and scope of the Dukes class. Classes the size of Dukes are
rare and, as a result, the Dukes decision was very fact specific. With
1.5 million potential class members challenging discrimination nation-
wide, this case unquestionably tested the outer bounds of what it takes
to hold a class together. Smaller classes are bound to be more suc-
cessful, for both Title VII and other cases.
Plaintiffs' counsel are already adapting by bringing smaller cases
that are geographically limited to create a tighter connection between
the decision makers and the alleged discrimination. However, the
smaller sample size will be less likely to yield empirical data that is
statistically significant, which creates litigation challenges for
plaintiffs.
Other ways that plaintiffs' counsel can adjust, and are adjusting, to
the Dukes commonality standard include seeking issue certification
under Rule 23(c)(4), 42 creating subclasses, 43 defining the class more
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues."); see, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2012) (certifying a Rule 23(c)(4) class on the
issue of whether Merrill Lynch's employment policies had a disparate impact on African-Ameri-
can employees); United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Issue
certification of bifurcated liability-phase questions is fully consistent with Wal-Mart's careful at-
tention to the distinct procedural protections attending (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes.").
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5) ("When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that
are each treated as a class under this rule."); see, e.g., Calloway v. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd., No.
2:11-cv-15465, 2012 WL 3568800, at *1, *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2012) (certifying two subclasses
of pharmaceutical employees who alleged that they were laid off without receiving proper no-
tice); Ugas v. H & R Block Enters., LLC, No. CV 09-6510-CAS, 2011 WL 3439219, at *7-12
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (certifying two subclasses of tax professionals who alleged that they
were not paid overtime and did not receive meal breaks in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
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narrowly, 44 distinguishing Dukes,45 and filing class actions in state
court.
4 6
On the other hand, the Court's ruling may have a big impact in
other ways. For example, Dukes may cut short a number of employ-
ment discrimination class actions premised on the theory of excessive
subjectivity as a discriminatory policy. Although Dukes seems ex-
traordinary because of its size, it is not extraordinary when it comes to
the plaintiffs' underlying theory of liability-the vehicle for discrimi-
nation is a policy of excessive subjectivity. In this way, Dukes is the
norm rather than the exception. This means that the ruling has the
potential to impact many cases premised on the same theory, includ-
ing those outside of the Title VII context. Cases brought under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act,47 the Fair Housing Act, 48 and § 198149
that challenged lenders' discretionary pricing policies as discrimina-
tory have already suffered this fate. 50
44. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the bankruptcy
court's grant of certification for plaintiffs' redefined class). Additionally, following Dukes, the
plaintiffs narrowed their class definition to female employees in the California area. The United
States District Court in the Northern District of California rejected Wal-Mart's motion to dis-
miss and stated that it would later consider the motion for certification. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 4329009, at *2, *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012).
Similar regional actions have been filed in Texas, Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Odle v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 3:11-CV-02954-O (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 19, 2012), Florida, Class Action
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 9:12-CV-81084-XXXX
(S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 4,2012), and Tennessee, Class Action Complaint, Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 3:12-CV-01009 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 2, 2012).
45. See, e.g., Connor B. v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 31-33 (D. Mass. 2011) (denying defendant's
motion to decertify a class of 8,500 children in custody of the Massachusetts Department of
Children and Families alleging constitutional violations, and noting that the Dukes decision "did
not change the law for all class action certifications"); Gray v. Golden Gate Nat'l Recreation
Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 518-19 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a 23(b)(2) class of disabled citizens
seeking an injunction under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and stating that "[t]hough
the Supreme Court did not expressly limit its holding in [Dukes] to Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases, Plaintiffs' arguments [that the decision should not apply to injunctive actions
under the Rehabilitation Act] are generally persuasive"); Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911,
2011 WL 3563489, at *1-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011) (granting certification of a portion of a class
of insurance policyholders who were denied coverage for autism treatment, distinguishing the
facts of the case from Dukes, noting Cigna had a clear nationwide policy to deny certain autism
treatments, and thus finding the Dukes holding "inapposite" in the present case).
46. See, e.g., Jackson v. Unocal Corp., 262 P.3d 874, 890 (Colo. 2011) (certifying two classes of
plaintiffs alleging harm from release of asbestos during pipeline removal); Desselle v. Acadian
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 83 So. 3d 1243, 1245 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (granting certification of a class
asserting that a health care provider "impermissibly demanded and/or collected sums in excess
of the discounted rates negotiated with the plaintiffs' health insurance providers").
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
50. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 08-MD-1974, 2011
WL 4862174, at *1-4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) (denying certification of a putative class of plain-
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Another significant impact that will likely play out is more discov-
ery at the class certification stage. The Supreme Court confirmed the
importance of a rigorous analysis, including resolving merits questions
that overlap with class certification issues.51 But the extent to which
merits should be considered and the amount of proof necessary at
class certification stage is still being debated. For example, courts dis-
agree over the propriety of subjecting experts to the Daubert test 52
and of using a preponderance of the evidence standard at class certifi-
cation.5 3 More inquiry into the merits of a case means more expensive
and time-consuming discovery at the class certification stage.
tiffs alleging that Countrywide violated the antidiscriminatory lending provisions of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Civil Rights Act because the plaintiffs
failed to show that defendant's discretionary policy of allowing brokers to exercise autonomy to
form "teams" to sign up new clients and share and service existing clients amounted to a com-
mon method of discrimination); Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank, 277 F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (denying class certification in a case alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and explaining that "[pllaintiffs would likely have to show the disparate
impact and analysis for each loan officer or at a minimum each group of loan officers working
for a specific supervisor" (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011)));
In re Wells Fargo Residential Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-MD-01930, 2011 WL
3903117, at *1-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (denying certification of a putative class alleging that
Wells Fargo's discretionary pricing program violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act because plaintiffs did no? establish that the discretionary pricing program
amounted to a common mode of discrimination as required by Dukes).
51. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,2551-53 (2011) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)).
52. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that for
expert testimony to be admissible, the trial judge must determine "that an expert's testimony
both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand"); see also Messner v.
Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812-14 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a district
court must apply a full Daubert analysis at the class certification stage if the expert testimony is
"critical" to certification); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th
Cir. 2011) ("We concluded that the district court did not err by conducting a focused Daubert
analysis which scrutinized the reliability of the expert testimony in light of the criteria for class
certification and the current state of the evidence."); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d
970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring a full Daubert analysis at class certification stage and addition-
ally requiring the trial judge to determine the "persuasiveness" of the expert's testimony); Behr-
end v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 204 n.13 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing the need "to evaluate
whether an expert is presenting a model which could evolve to become admissible evidence," but
not requiring a full Daubert analysis); Franklin v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., No. C10-5183BHS, 2011
WL 5166458, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2011) (expressing doubt that the plaintiff's evidence
had met the Daubert standard in a motion for class certification, but excluding plaintiffs' expert
testimony because it had "no bearing on the elements of [his] cause of action under Washington
law").
53. Compare In re Am. Int'l. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010)) (requiring the party seeking certification
to establish the Rule 23 requirements by a preponderance of the evidence), and In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Factual determinations necessary to
make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence."), with CE Design
Ltd. v. Cy's Crabhouse N., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135, 140 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport
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B. The Impact of the Back Pay Ruling
The implications of this unanimous portion of the Dukes opinion
are mixed. The Supreme Court may have made class certification
harder for employees seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2),
but it did not eliminate Title VII class actions altogether.
The Court's ruling will make it more difficult for employees alleging
systemic misconduct under Title VII to seek back pay and other types
of monetary relief. This is because it is now harder for plaintiffs to use
Rule 23(b)(2)-the federal class action rule that was designed to stop
systemic discrimination-if they are also seeking monetary relief (in-
cluding back pay). Therefore, it is unlikely that classes seeking back
pay can be certified under (b)(2), but monetary relief that is "indivisi-
ble"-like statutory damages-probably could.
Because of this more difficult certification standard, employees may
decide to pursue various alternatives, including only injunctive and
declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2); injunctive and declaratory re-
lief under Rule 23(b)(2), and monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3) (a
hybrid); or all relief under Rule 23(b)(3). The most drastic alternative
would be foregoing class relief altogether.
These alternatives raise their own set of problems. First of all,
money matters. Deciding not to pursue monetary relief altogether be-
cause it is too difficult compromises law enforcement. Back pay not
only makes victims of discrimination "whole," but it also encourages
voluntary compliance with the law. Second, using Rule 23(b)(3)
brings its own challenges, as discussed previously. Rule 23(b)(3) is
useful in that it requires that class members be provided notice of the
litigation and the right to opt out of a class whose cohesion is admit-
tedly compromised by varied monetary interests, thereby addressing
any due process concerns. But requiring proof of common issues and
payment for notice may foreclose aggregate litigation altogether.54
These outcomes increase the risk of underenforcement.
Given that the Dukes ruling on back pay was anchored in Title VII,
however, it may have a limited impact on cases brought in other sub-
stantive areas and under different statutes. For example, many courts
are rejecting the notion that there must be individualized back pay
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001)) (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiffs
must establish every element of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence).
54. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "You Just Can't Get There from Here": A Primer on Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 80 U.S. L. WK. 93 (2011) ("In all circuits, the predominance standard has long been the
Grim Reaper of putative class actions, and the sprawling character of the [Dukes]
class ... doomed it from the start-if the predominance standard applied.").
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determinations in collective actions brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.5 5
V. CONCLUSION
We know that the Dukes decision has redefined the class certifica-
tion requirements for Title VII cases in ways that may jeopardize po-
tentially meritorious challenges to systemic employment
discrimination. Although the ultimate scope and magnitude of the de-
cision's impact is unclear, it is apparent that everyday workers like
Betty Dukes will have a higher hurdle to clear to obtain access to
justice.
What does the Dukes decision mean in a broader context? The Su-
preme Court's treatment of class actions has not been uniform. On
the one hand, class actions have taken a hit; Dukes is a case in point.
Another example is AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which
makes it easier for corporations to eradicate class actions by inserting
class action bans in their arbitration agreements. 56
On the other hand, class action plaintiffs have enjoyed success. For
example, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to require securities fraud
plaintiffs to prove "loss causation" at the class certification stage to
meet the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3). 5 7 In addi-
tion, in Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Supreme Court unanimously held
that putative class members may get another bite at the apple in state
court if a federal court denies class certification first. 58 So the jury is
55. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); see Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186
CW, 2011 WL 5242977, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (denying defendant's motion to decer-
tify a conditional class of employees alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act on the
grounds that the employer was not entitled to an individualized determination of each em-
ployee's claim for back pay, and noting that Dukes "does not stand for the proposition that an
employer is entitled to an individualized determination of an employee's claim for back pay in
all instances in which a claim is brought as a collective or class action"); Faust v. Comcast Cable
Commc'ns Mgmt., LLC, No WMN-10-2336, 2011 WL 5244421, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011)
(conditionally certifying a class of employees alleging Fair Labor Standards Act violations, and
noting that because Dukes was a Title VII case, it did not control cases brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Troy v. Kehe Food Distribs., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 642, 657 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
("Dukes does not ... prevent plaintiffs from seeking certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class-as
opposed to a Rule 23(b)(2) class-where the amount of damages for each class member may
depend on an individualized analysis.").
56. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that predispute arbi-
tration clauses prohibiting class actions were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2).
57. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).
58. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
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still out on class actions, and this is just one part of an even broader
picture.
The class action rulings take place in a larger context that indicates
that plaintiffs in general are facing greater challenges bringing civil
rights suits because of procedural hurdles in the civil litigation system.
For example, claimants now have a more difficult time gaining access
to the federal courts, as the criteria for a complaint to survive dismis-
sal are more strenuous after Twombly and Iqbal.5 9 The Court has
continued the trend of consistently deferring to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, which force many individuals to rely on a pri-
vate arbitrator to resolve their disputes without a variety of important
court procedural protections. Moreover, we see more summary judg-
ment dispositions and fewer cases ever making it to a jury trial.
So why should we care about this? Class actions are just one exam-
ple of the power and promise of procedure. Procedure requires us to
balance competing interests like justice with efficiency (as stated in
the very first rule of civil procedure) and to defend fundamental val-
ues such as due process. But most importantly, procedure is a vehicle
that empowers people, and gives them the courage to fight injustices,
if only we let them.
59. See Malveaux, supra note 13, at 623-31 (explaining that civil rights plaintiffs are particu-
larly disadvantaged by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions because, without the opportunity to
conduct discovery, plaintiffs may lack sufficient facts to make a "plausible" case that they suf-
fered discrimination and, additionally, that the plausibility standard is overly subjective and un-
predictable because its determination relies on an individual judge's "experience and common
sense").
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